Although there has been more than thirty years of equal pay legislation in the European Union the gap between male and female earnings has remained remarkably resilient and is present across all Member States regardless of Member State institutional arrangements.
Introduction
The gender pay gap captures the enduring inequalities that exist in the labour market between women and men . Although there has been more than thirty years of equal pay legislation in the European Union the gap between male and female earnings has remained remarkably resilient and is present across all Member States regardless of the overall level of female employment, welfare models or their own national histories of equality legislation ). Recent improvements in methodology and data collection at the European level only serve to underline the intransient nature of the pay gap and the challenge of reducing pay inequalities (Eurostat 2009; . This is perhaps one of the reasons that Trade Unions have been somewhat reluctant to engage actively in closing the gap. On the other hand it is also important to recognise that collective negotiation of wages is one of the factors maintaining existing wage structures and gender inequalities (Gannon et al. 2006) .
In spite of limited progress in recent years, the European Union has played a pivotal role in shaping the regulatory landscape for gender equality including the gender pay gap. Indeed the Directives of the mid-1970s were a major force for a change in mind-sets around pay inequalities and promoter of considerable regulatory and institutional change at the Member State level . Some thirty years later, the appetite for new regulations has changed. Not only do the size and heterogeneity of Member States limit the scope of equality initiatives, but also the neoliberal agenda and the dominant model of promoting convergence, via soft rather than hard regulation, constrain action (ETUI 2009; .
Thus outside the main mechanisms of its Employment Strategy, the Commission has placed considerable emphasis on soft mechanisms, including the role of social partners, in dealing with gender gaps. While such an approach might be considered timid given the persistence of the gender pay gap, the key role which social partners play in negotiating pay in many EU countries means that social partner negotiations are perhaps the locus for progress.
Furthermore the drawback of the Commission in this area means that there is a greater reliance on Member State initiatives to make progress against pay inequalities. This paper is divided into five sections. After this introduction, we briefly introduce the gender pay gap in Europe and the reasons why social regulation of pay inequalities have come to the fore in Europe. The third section takes a critical perspective on the role of social partners in promoting gender equality. The fourth section examines the progress and limitations of social partners in addressing the gender pay gap firstly at the European level and secondly in the case of France, a country where a legal obligation to negotiate has been introduced. The fifth and final section considers the prospects for social regulation of the gender pay gap.
Gender Pay Gap, the EU and Social Regulation
The Gender Pay Gap is both a simple and complex term -simply measuring the gap between male and female pay, whether hourly, weekly, or monthly as just one aspect of a wider picture of gender inequities but also capturing the complex processes on the labour market that lead to women's disadvantage. A range of factors help reinforce male and female wage disparities. At one level, sex segregation and stereotyping processes confine women and men to different parts of the labour market with different rewards, often undervaluing women's work (Colgan and Ledwith 1996; ).
The vertical segregation of women and men into different positions in organisational hierarchies, including through discriminatory processes, limited women's career progression Wass and McNabb 2005) . In addition the impact of the uneven division of domestic labour on the ability of women and men to devote time to careers and labour market work. As a result both part-time work and time out of the labour market on leave impact upon current and lifetime earnings profiles (Joshi and Davies 1992; . The impact of women's concentration in nonstandard jobs further reinforces lower pay and weaker career prospects . Finally organisational innovations such as 'new' individualised pay systems, which increase pay diversity among employees at similar levels, further reduce transparency and disadvantage women (Huffman 2004) .
The gender pay gap is defined as the difference between men's and women's hourly pay divided by men's hourly pay. It is the difference between men's and women's average gross hourly earnings which tends to be used and it relates only to paid employees.
1 The so-called unadjusted measure of the gender pay gap captures the overall or raw gap in men's and women's hourly wages. Some of this gap can be explained by observable characteristics of male and female employees -these include differences in education, labour market experience, type of job and company characteristics. Adjustment for these observable characteristics reduces the gender pay gap but does not eliminate it and large differences remain (Callan et al. 2009 ). Furthermore many of these observable characteristics are also sources of disadvantage and indirect discrimination. Recent advances in the methodology of assessing the extent of the gender pay gap have only served to underline the persistence of the disparity between women and men's pay, with
1 By using the gross hourly pay the gender pay gap measures reward on the labour market independent of any impact from taxation.
women on average in the EU currently earning approximately 18% less per hour than men ( Member States ) and embodies the equality principles of the founding treaty . Mazey (1998:146-7) describes the almost overnight change following the mobilisation of Article 119 with a "flurry" of Member States legislation and/or introduction or upgrading of equality bodies. As with most legislative developments, the implementation of the Directives at the Member State level has been shaped by systems of national rules and norms and in this process some dilution and country variation takes place (Velluti 2010) . In practice the implementation of Directives has required the evaluation of the value of women's and men's jobs via systems that have not necessarily been value free and thus may have inhibited progress against pay gaps. The nature of the gender pay gap means that, to be effective, the presence of a common legislative framework needs to be complemented with multi-faceted policies to address wage disparities.
Although there has been an absence of hard legislation in addressing the gender pay gap since the major steps forward in the 1970s, there have been other European level pressures to address the factors affecting the gender pay gap in EU Labour markets . As in other policy areas, the Commission can be regarded as "a promoter and an impresario as much as legislative leaders" with the ability to set agendas and promote dialogue (Hine 1998:8 (CEC 2009e). Thus an important element of dealing with the pay gap in Europe is the involvement of the social partners.
The Role of Social Partners in Addressing Pay Inequalities
On the one hand, the renewed approach towards the gender pay gap can be considered a weak compromise based on a limited support for further hard law to tackle gender equalities and a reliance on elements of the social protocol to include the social partners as a catalyst for action. However, on the other hand, the engagement with social partners, as key actors in the wage formation mechanisms in many member states, can be considered as recognition of the need for action at multiple levels. So although not supported by new legislative proposals, the inclusion of social partners as a means to address pay inequalities can also be seen as an innovation in the light of stagnation of progress in the hard law approach.
In fact the mobilisation of social partners in addressing pay inequalities can be seen as simply exercising the existing legal framework. Indeed as Foubert points out "parties to a collective labour agreement have to comply with the equal pay principle, as laid down in EU law and in various legal provisions" implying that the "provisions of a collective labour agreement should be in accordance with the principle of equal pay for men and women" (2010:12) . Nevertheless collective labour agreements may still contain provisions that have an indirect discriminatory impact on women's earnings for example job evaluation and pay systems that structurally disadvantage female workers (ibid: 13). In Belgium a recent collective agreement has led to the adoption of a gender neutral job evaluation system but this is the exception rather than the rule (Meulders 2010).
An approach drawing upon on social partners does however recognise the complex web of factors acting to maintain the gender pay gap and also the variety of actors at different levels that are involved in pay determination, labour market regulation and shaping women's and men's experience of work. Whitehouse (2003:125) calls for a "multidisciplinary and multi-methodological approach" to researching pay equity and we can extend this advice to policy mechanisms addressing the gender pay gap itself. A focus on the gender pay gap from a more holistic position necessitates the gender mainstreaming of policy and practice around wage setting (Plantenga et al. 2008) . This also . Elivra and Saporta (2001) confirm this finding but also that the effect is stronger in feminised sectors suggesting unions have a greater role of play in feminised sectors in reducing the gender pay gap. In fact the benefits for women of union membership extend further and Allen and Sanders (2006) find that women's pay can benefit more than men's from union membership, although these positive outcomes are not always by design. For example, Whitehouse (2003:124-5) suggests that the Australian system of centralised industrial relations has been beneficial for pay equity even though it has been based on male norms and "pay equity gains have primarily been the accidental outcomes of structure rather than evidence of a capacity to avoid gender bias in the valuation of skills" (see also . Similarly in Italy, before its abolition, The engagement of social partners in the fight against the gender pay gap can also be considered an appropriate mechanism for coping with institutional heterogeneity across EU Member States (Schulten 2008) . Recognition of the variety of wage setting systems at the national level would be useful in addressing persistent pay gaps. The gender segregation across work places is important in explaining low pay so tackling sectoral inequalities would be a useful step ). As such, a reduction of the gender pay gap might be achieved not only with action that works with the variety of national industrial relations systems, but also targeted policies that may vary between specific systems within Member States ).
On the other hand, there are a number of weaknesses for using the social partners to address the gender pay gap. The uneven distribution of social partners across sectors also needs to be recognised, for example organisations may span regions rather than sectors where specific action on pay gaps may be required, for example the federal unions in Similarly Ebbinghaus notes that the gender pay gap has often fallen through the gap of social partners and government policy interests since "governments have thus far focused less on equal pay issues than on formal anti-discrimination policies and promotion of female employment, while the collective bargaining partners were less willing to renegotiate the wage structure than pushing for general pay increases" (2002:10-11). A study by Soumeli and Neergard (2002) suggested that social partners tended to view pay equality as an issue for governments and legislation rather than one for collective bargaining. In addition "existing wage discrepancies between men and women [were] seen as a consequence of positional differences in working life which is too big an issue to be solved through negotiations" (ibid:1) . Furthermore, and rather like policy priorities at the European and National level, these authors suggested that raising women's employment level was seen as more important than addressing gender pay gaps. her report, the penalties for a lack of negotiation were proposed but were left for negotiations or legislation.
The Gresy report contained the possibility for two kinds of penalties. Firstly a two stage sanction with a penalty for not having completed the report (RSC) and secondly a penalty on non-compliance in negotiating an agreement or unilateral plan. The report proposes "10 levers of equality" to be addressed in these negotiations (the number ranging from 2 to 10 depending on the size of the company). In addition, two penalties were proposed. 
Conclusions and Discussion
The shift in focus from hard law to soft law, from governmental action to social partner action reflects the realpolitik of European institutions with a more limited focus on promoting equality goals, a high concern for creating jobs and a large and heterogeneous Member State membership. This timidity in relation to gender quality goals has been noted in the wider employment strategy (Fagan et al. 2006; and is clearly evident in the 2010 re-launch of the Strategy as EU2020 (see for example EC 2010b).
By creating obligations on social partners to negotiate to close gender pay gaps, there is at least in principle the possibility to address some of the root causes of gender pay inequalities that have evaded more than 30 years of equal pay legislation. By creating obligations on organisations the concern for equality becomes a proactive one rather than a reactive issue when complaints of unfair treatment are received. Hepple (2007:225) describes the importance of shifting "from negative duties towards positive duties to promote equality" and outlines a pyramid of responsibilities that can be used by public authorities ranging from informational campaigns to the use of public procurement to encourage positive behaviours. also advocates a more proactive system where there is regular monitoring of compliance rather than a reliance on individuals to initiate complaints. Creating obligations addresses one of the problems with individual complaint-based system where the worst offenders rarely surface (Colgan et al 1996) . A system based on obligations permits equality organisations to initiate their own investigations and requires employers to be proactive (op cit). Evidence from Canada in the 1990s suggests some employers take the opportunity to change while others are encouraged because of a legal requirement to be active. The obligations on social partners to bargain on equal pay in France created a potential pressure for change in wage determination. However, the 2010 revisions to the legislation, and the nature of subsequent implementation, may have neutralised the effects of the legislation. The potential for social partners to leverage such legislation to close gender gaps remains but the motivation to do so may not be forthcoming.
Just as women themselves have been described as "swimming up stream" in their individual progress against the gender pay gap we can also see some of the same challenges facing Trade Unions as actors to challenge the existing order, promote gender equality and specifically close gender pay gaps. As
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